On 9 August 2010, the General Assembly held an informal dialogue to discuss the Secretary-General’s second report on ‘the responsibility to protect’.* The main purpose of the brief report (Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect) was to test Member States’ reactions to the proposed establishment of an early warning mechanism within the UN Secretariat.

On 9 August 2010, the General Assembly held an informal dialogue to discuss the Secretary-General’s second report on ‘the responsibility to protect’.* The main purpose of the brief report (Early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect) was to test Member States’ reactions to the proposed establishment of an early warning mechanism within the UN Secretariat. The proposed office would be jointly headed by the Special Adviser for the prevention of genocide, Mr Francis Deng, and the Special Adviser for the conceptual, political and institutional development of the responsibility to protect, Mr Ed Luck. They would be tasked with advising the Secretary-General (and through him, the Security Council) if a situation could result in genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, and developing a range of options to address the situation. Drawing on the lessons learned from the UN’s failures in relation to the Rwandan genocide and the fall of Srebrenica, the joint office would address two gaps in the UN system: insufficient sharing of information across the system; and failure to provide a timely and well-informed response.

The debate in the Assembly was well attended by Member States, with many represented by their most senior delegates, despite UN Headquarters being in holiday mode. The Secretary-General introduced the report and the dialogue was preceded by a panel discussion that included Francis Deng, Ed Luck and former Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Bertrand Ramcharan. Of the 42 States that spoke, the vast majority agreed that the UN was not suffering from a shortage of information. Rather it lacked the ability to generate a timely and accurate assessment of the situation on the ground, and a range of policy options, so that early action would be well-informed and tailor-made. However there was a wide range of views as to the best way to overcome these shortcomings and prevent mass atrocity crimes, with a handful of States remaining hostile to the very concept of the responsibility to protect.  

In terms of next steps, ‘later in 2010’, the Secretary-General will submit a concrete budget proposal to the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee (which deals with budget matters). Given the spectrum of views amongst the membership of the General Assembly on how best to proceed, there is concern that the proposal will encounter strong opposition. Even though it is clear that the Secretary-General is proposing a small and quite modest office in terms of staff and resources, there is likely to also be resistance to any additional expenditure within the Secretariat.

Several States gave in principle support to the joint office proposal (Benin, Botswana, Canada, Chile, EU, France, Ghana, Peru, Tanzania, UK). Others were supportive, but said they needed more “concrete information” on how the joint office would work in practice (Australia, Brazil, Czech Republic, Nepal, Nigeria, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Uruguay, US). A number of supportive States stressed that the success of the joint office would depend not only on greater cooperation across the UN system, but also its ability to work in partnership with regional and sub-regional organisations, and civil society.

Sounding a more critical note, India concluded that the Secretary-General’s report only presented part of the answer. In its opinion, the joint office alone would not be sufficient to avoid another Rwanda or Srebrenica. Although it echoed the comments of others that a more comprehensive early warning mechanism was needed (involving regional, sub-regional and civil society organisations), India went a step further. It argued that the process “must be Member State driven” because the risk of delegating responsibility for the collection and analysis of information to the Secretariat was “half-backed ideas” and a “fishing expedition”. China was similarly concerned about the need to uphold State sovereignty and the principle of non-interference as provided in the UN Charter. Egypt suggested that a further safeguard against any restrictions on State sovereignty would be provided if the General Assembly “governed” the UN’s early warning mechanism, rather than the Security Council.

A third group of States was more critical, arguing that beyond the abhorrence of mass atrocity crimes, and State responsibility to protect civilians, there was no consensus (Cuba, Iran, Pakistan, Nicaragua, Sudan, Venezuela). Disagreeing with the Secretary-General’s report, these States argued that another set of underlying problems explained why the UN had failed in the past. Key among these was that the General Assembly had been “usurped” by the Security Council. Further, the Security Council operated in a selective and politicised manner, and thus lacked the competence to deal with R2P questions. However, their suggestion that the operationalisation of R2P should be put on hold until a legal definition of the term was agreed, and until the membership of the Security Council was reformed, indicated their preference for the maintenance of the status quo.

Clearly frustrated by such stalling tactics, and mindful that the Assembly had been discussing the concept of R2P in one form or another for over a decade, some States called for urgent action. Perhaps the most compelling of these came from Ghana. Like other African States, it pointed out that the responsibility to protect was enshrined in the African Union’s constitution, proving it could co-exist with the principle of State sovereignty. Ghana also reminded the General Assembly that it had declared apartheid a crime against humanity, showing States that they could not hide behind the principle of State sovereignty to commit gross human rights violations, and they should not attempt to misuse the concept of R2P in a similar fashion.

Also taking part in the dialogue was the African Union, and two NGOs: International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, and the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.

On a positive note, the General Assembly welcomed the Secretary-General’s suggestion that the next informal interactive dialogue on R2P in 2011 should address the role of regional and sub-regional organisations in implementing the responsibility to protect.

Further analysis of the interactive dialogue, is available from the International Coalition for the Responsibilty to Protect, including some links to the government statements delivered.

* Also referred to as ‘R2P’, this concept relates to the obligation of States toward their populations and toward all populations at risk of genocide and other large-scale atrocities. It was endorsed by the General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (paragraphs 138 and 139), and reaffirmed in September 2009 in a consensus resolution (63/308). The resolution was the outcome of a three-day debate in the GA debate that was convened to discuss the January 2009 report of the UN Secretary-General:  ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.’